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Migration and Inheritance Practices 








Most theoretical approaches to inheritance assume that parents are the key actors of 
bequest decisions. However, in a context of important migration, children may play an 
active role in the inheritance process. Based on a unique data set collected at both ends 
of the migration link in Bolivia, we are able to show that migrant children significantly 
influence the way inheritance is distributed through their decision to accept or refuse 
their share of inheritance. This decision is not only influenced by the migrants need for 
economic security but also by the transaction costs associated to land ownership. Yet, 
land inheritance is not completely driven by the demand for inheritance of the children. 
Parents continue to play an important role and the identity of the person responsible for 
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1 Introduction 
Land tenure is one of the key determinants of the welfare of rural households, and inheritance 
from parents remains the principal mean of access to landownership for most families. The 
role of land inheritance is all the more crucial in developing countries where land markets are 
highly imperfect and sometimes close to nonexistent. Yet, outside opportunities provided by 
migration could reduce the importance of land tenure for young rural adults. Migration is 
indeed a major phenomenon in developing countries and as such has probably had a 
significant impact on inheritance practices in the native communities of the migrants. On the 
one hand, parents might change their inheritance strategy and choose to exclude some 
children, namely those who migrated, from land bequest because they perceive them to have 
a less urgent need for land than their non-migrant siblings. On the other hand, potential heirs 
might start to play a more active role in the inheritance decision and some migrant offspring 
might choose to forgo their share of inheritance. This decision might stem from altruistic 
motivations. In a context of land scarcity, some migrant children might indeed choose to 
forfeit their rights in favour of more needy siblings. However, high transaction costs and the 
relatively low benefits of land property compared to urban earnings could also explain the 
migrants’ decisions to forsake land inheritance.  
 
So far, in the economic literature, inheritance strategies have been principally approached 
from the parental perspective, assuming that parents are the ultimate decision makers in the 
inheritance process. In this context, the motives driving the parents’ decision to unequally 
bequeath their assets have received significant attention from scholars in different disciplines 
and three explanations have been put forward. 
 
The first explanation for unequal bequest is based on the assumption that parents take their 
decisions following a set of predetermined rules or norms. These will lead to either single 
heirdom, as it was the case in Europe around the eleventh and twelfth century, or unequal 
multiple heirdom, favouring sons over daughters, for example. The presence of economies of 
scales in military expenditure, indivisibility of political power (see Platteau and Baland 2001 
for a thorough review), legacy of patriarchy (ibid.) or the maximization of family wealth 
(Chu 1991) have been advanced as possible explanations for the practice of exclusive 
inheritance. 
 
Altruism of the parents has been suggested as a second explanation for unequal bequest 
(Becker 1974; Becker and Tomes 1979). Here, the central idea is that altruistic parents want 
all of their children to be equally well off. Consequently, they give a higher share of 
inheritance to those children who are less wealthy in order to equalize the marginal utilities of 
their children. Although this second explanation might seem rather intuitive, the evidence is 
mixed. Light and Mc Garry (2004) observe that in a context of important income differences 
between children, altruism is evoked by the parents to explain unequal bequest and Tomes 
(1981) finds a strong significant compensatory effect for inheritance based on US data. 
However, later studies for the USA and France (Wilhelm 1996; Arrondel and Lafferrère 
1992) find only limited or even no support for the altruistic model.  
 
The last motive purported to lie behind unequal bequest refers to exchanges between parents 
and their children. In exchange models, bequest is used by the parents as either a payment for 
services such as household care, money transfers or remittances provided by the children   2
(Cox 1987; Cox and Rank 1992) or as an enforcement device to insure that children comply 
with the obligations they have contracted against their parents (Hodinott 1994). In this 
context, the strategic bequest model of Bernheim et al. (1985) can be particularly highlighted. 
Their model is based on the assumption that parents try to influence their children’s 
behaviour by withholding part of their wealth for bequest and by conditioning an children’s 
inheritance share on her caring behaviour. In this setting, the care provided by the potential 
heirs will increase with family wealth and with the credibility of the threat of disinheritance. 
Using migration data from Botswana, Lucas and Starck (1985) show that remittances tend to 
increase with parental wealth. Hoddinott (1992), Schrieder and Knerr (2000) and de la Brière 
et al. (2002) find the same results for Kenya, Cameroon and the Dominican Republic 
respectively. Finally, in the context of a matrilineal ethnic group in rural Ghana, La Ferrara 
(2007) shows that an increase in the threat of disinheritance increases inter-vivo transfers 
from children towards their parents. 
 
To our knowledge there is, with one important exception, no study that considers the active 
role of potential heirs in the inheritance decision. In their study of communities of the 
Peruvian Highlands Goetghebuer and Platteau (2010) find indeed evidence that migrant 
children may choose to voluntarily forsake their share of family land thus appearing as key 
protagonists in the inheritance process. Due to a lack of suitable data the authors were 
nevertheless unable to clearly distinguish between the strategic bequest theory and what they 
label the demand for inheritance theory. 
 
The assumption that parents take the bequest decision might be reasonable in a context of low 
migration or for regions which are characterized by land abundance, low transaction costs, 
and well-functioning land markets. But this assumption is less appealing for most developing 
countries. In this respect, the Bolivian Altiplano is representative of many other regions in the 
developing world where malfunctioning land markets, land scarcity and emigration have 
become key features of rural life. Yet, one aspect makes the Altiplano particularly interesting 
to study: the cargo system that applies to all landholding families. In the communities of the 
Bolivian Altiplano, access to land is preconditioned on the fulfilment of different types of 
community charges and duties. Household heads of landholding families have to contribute 
to community projects by providing money and labour, take regularly part in assemblies, and 
even more important, they have to assume authority positions following a rotation principle. 
During their assignment, they are expected to incur important financial burdens and devote a 
significant amount of time to their task. This is because authorities must organize and finance 
different ritual festivities and some mandates require regular presence of the office holder. 
Moreover, it is not possible to avoid these duties as most positions include ritual functions 
and a neglect of those is believed to be harmful to the community. In two out of the eight 
communities of our sample community members have lost their land because of a neglect of 
community duties. In addition, the possibility of land withdrawal as punishment for the non-
respect of these duties has been mentioned in all the communities. Land tenure is therefore 
associated with high costs in the Bolivian Altiplano and while the benefits of land ownership 
presumably exceed the costs for most members living within the community it is far less 
obvious if this is also the case for migrants who reside outside of the community. For the 
latter, some community charges and duties may prove especially constraining possibly 
prompting them to forgo their land rights. 
 
The identification of the role of potential heirs in the inheritance decision is the major 
contribution of this paper. We show that a significant percentage of migrant children choose 
to give up their inheritance share. This has important welfare implications. While the value of   3
land may seem to be comparatively low for migrant children compared to their non migrant 
siblings, this is not true in most developing countries where labour markets are highly volatile 
and most rural migrants work in the informal sector without a contract and job security. In 
this context of high uncertainty, guaranteed land access in the native community provides a 
valuable fall-back option for migrants. Understanding whether children chose to forsake their 
claim on family land or whether the parents denied them access to land in the community is 
thus very important. Yet, it is not sufficient to draw welfare implications. Indeed we also 
have to analyse the motives behind migrants’ decisions to give up land inheritance. We will 
show that high transaction costs associated to landownership are among the main 
determinants of this decision and that these costs might drive migrants with low revenues and 
precarious work conditions to give up inheritance. Finally, we analyse the determinants of the 
parental bequest decision and highlight the important role of one factor which has not yet 
been studied in the context of the inheritance decision, i.e. the identity of the person 
responsible for the migration decision.  
 
The distinction between the role of parents and potential heirs in the inheritance process and 
the study of the impact of the migration decision is only possible thanks to the unique 
structure of our database. Indeed, data concerning migration practices and the inheritance 
process were collected at two levels: at the level of the migrant and at the level of their family 
members still living in their native community. This approach enables us to compare the 
answers of parents and their children and allows us to clearly identify the person ultimately 
responsible for the inheritance decision. Moreover, the availability of information at the two 
ends of the migration link also permits us to study the factors which influence the inheritance 
decisions of both protagonists. 
 
The outline of the paper is the following: Section 2 presents information about the data 
structure, Section 3 introduces the main variables of interest, Section 4 describes our 
estimation strategy, Section 5 provides the results, and Section 6 concludes.  
2 Data 
A survey was conducted at both ends of the migration process. Detailed information on 
inheritance practices, intra-household organization of property and usufruct rights, the 
children’s migration experience and the caring attitude of children towards their parents were 
gathered from migrants and their family members still living in the communities. Community 
surveys have first taken place in eight Aymara communities in the Bolivian Altiplano from 
October 2008 to February 2009. A year later a migrant survey was conducted in La Paz and 
El Alto during the same period.  
2.1 Sample  communities 
The eight communities of our sample have been chosen based on their distance from La Paz, 
so as to try to maximize the variation in the incidence of migration between villages. The 
community dataset is composed of two parts: data collected at household level, and data 
collected at community level.   4
Household survey 
In each of the eight communities, sixty households were drawn at random and were 
questioned following a methodology developed by Goetghebuer and Platteau (2010). 
Respondents (husband or wife) completed a parent-household and/or couple-household 
questionnaire. Couple-household questionnaires include questions concerning the inheritance 
rules that the respondents have adopted, or intend to adopt, vis-à-vis their own offspring and 
questions about the respondent’s children interest and participation in land tenure and 
migration experience. Parent-household questionnaires, on the other hand, contain questions 
regarding the respondent’s parents’ bequest decision and their childrens’ interest in land 
ownership and migration experience. Whenever possible, we collected three family stories 
per couple (one for the husband’s parents, one for the wife’s parents, and one for the couple). 
However, this was only possible for a limited number of families. Indeed, we chose to collect 
couple questionnaires only for households in which all the children were aged fifteen or 
above. This is because for those households one can reasonably assume that the number of 
children is known and should not increase in the future, and that the migration decision has 
been taken for all of the family members at the time of the interview. Also, we did not collect 
parent-household questionnaires for women who were not born in the community since 
inheritance and migration rules might be different in their native communities. In addition, to 
avoid redundant questionnaires and with a view of reducing the length of the interview, we 
did not collect data concerning one particular family story if we were already in possession of 
the data as a result of interviewing another family member. Finally, because of the level of 
detail and the ensuing length of time needed to complete one questionnaire some respondent 
couples refused to complete all three questionnaires. Our household-community sample is 
consequently composed of 454 households (295 parent-household questionnaires and 159 
couple-household questionnaires) representing 1,924 individuals.  
 
During our interviews with family members living in the communities, we paid special 
attention to the heirs’ role in the inheritance decision and to the question as to whether some 
children expressed disinterest in the land granted by their parents, perhaps driving them to 
refuse or give up the bequest. Concerning migration, emphasis was put on the identification 
of the person responsible for the migration decision, community rules and norms associated 
to migration, and the structure and organization of migration networks.  
Community survey 
Three community authorities, the community head, and two council members were 
interviewed about community norms associated to customary land tenure rights, land 
conflicts, inheritance rules, migration flows, migration norms, community governance 
structures, community investment projects, and other general community characteristics. 
2.2 Sample  migrants 
Migrant surveys have been conducted in La Paz and El Alto, the two main poles of attraction 
for migrants from the Bolivian Altiplano. Our migrant sample is constituted of migrants 
belonging to the households interviewed during the community survey. Tracing the migrants 
has been an extremely difficult task because the family members living in the communities of 
origin usually did not know the address of the migrants. As a consequence, we had to rely on 
hand drawings of family members living in the community and community-based migration 
networks to find the migrants. Moreover, due to its huge expansion, most streets in El Alto do   5
not possess a name and house numbers are randomly attributed making it even more difficult 
to locate someone. Consequently, we were only able to collect 354 migrant questionnaires 
out of a total of 700 migrants declared as living in La Paz or El Alto by our 454 rural 
households. Given the important attrition rate, we have to consider the possibility of a sample 
bias. However, based on the information we collected from the family members in the 
community of origin we can conclude that, concerning the key aspects of our study, the 
migrants whom we did not get to interview are not statistically different from the migrants we 
surveyed in the second round .Our final household sample is composed of 871 individuals: 
the migrants interviewed during the second round and their siblings. 
 
During the migrant survey, we collected detailed data on the migrants’ interest and 
involvement in the family farm in their native community, their migration experience, work 
conditions, social network in La Paz and El Alto and relations with family members that 
stayed behind. 
3  Key variables and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Inheritance 
Land is the main bequeathable asset for families in the Bolivian Altiplano. On average, the 
parents of the final household sample hold 19 hectares of land (Table 1). This seems large 
compared to family estates in some other countries, yet scarcity of cultivable land and poor 
soil quality are important issues for almost all households of our survey communities. Land 
productivity is very low as only a very limited number of vegetables can be cultivated at high 
altitude (4000 m above sea level) under the harsh weather conditions of the Altiplano. There 
are also important differences in terms of land holdings in our sample. The biggest 
landowners, belonging to the highest decile of the land distribution, hold more than 40 
hectares whereas the family estates, from the lowest decile of the land distribution are 
composed of less than 130 m².  





























Source: see text. 
Inheritance distribution 
Inheritance distribution follows an egalitarian norm in the Altiplano and it is very rare that a 
child living in the community is excluded from inheritance. In our sample, among the 
children for whom inheritance did already take place only one biological child, still alive at 
the moment of the inheritance, was excluded by his parents from inheritance. However, this 
egalitarian rule does not seem to apply to migrant children among which 40 per cent   6
experienced exclusion and 36 per cent were favourably treated1. During the interviews, 
parents cited migration, a lack of interest in land and poor attention from their offspring as 
the main reasons why some of them received unprivileged treatment. They explained that 
some children received privileged treatment because they either cared more for their parents 
or showed more interest in land.   
Migrants’ interest in land 
The lack of interest in the parents’ land was confirmed during interviews of the migrants. 
Thirteen per cent declared that they told their parents that they were not interested in their 
land, and 12 per cent stated that they had refused or given away the land bequeathed to them 
(Table 2). Moreover, 23 per cent of the migrants were unable to report the size of their 
parents’ landholdings, which also reflects a relatively low interest in land. 
Table 2: Migrant childrens’ interest in land 
 % 
 
Migrants informed parents that they were not interested in 
inheriting land 
 
Migrants refused their share of inheritance 
 








Source: see text. 
3.2 Migration 
Because of the difficult living conditions within the communities many young adults have 
chosen or were forced to leave their native communities. At the time of the survey, 84 per 
cent of the families interviewed in the first round counted at least one migrant, and 57 per 
cent of the children belonging to the households of our community sample had migrated. In 
the Altiplano, migration is with very few exceptions permanent and only 4 per cent of the 
children who have migrated have returned to their community after a short period of time. 
However, 38 per cent of the migrants interviewed in La Paz or El Alto plan to move back to 
the community in some distant future. Urban centres within Bolivia are the main destinations 
for the migrants of our sample, and La Paz and El Alto alone attract 72 per cent of the 
migrants belonging to the households of our community sample. Important wage differentials 
make neighbouring South American countries such as Argentina, Chile and Brazil attractive 
for migrants from the Bolivian Altiplano and 7 per cent of the migrants of our community 
sample chose to migrate to this second type of destination. Surrounding communities 
constitute a third important destination for rural Bolivian migrants (14 per cent). Migration 
starts at a very young age and the migrants of our sample left their community at the age of 
18, on average. 
                                                 
1 We consider on the one hand that a child receives a fair treatment during the inheritance process if her share of 
land inheritance is equal to the total amount of land owned by her parents divided by the number of children. On 
the other hand, we consider that a child is unfavourably or favourably treated during the inheritance process if 
she receives a smaller or respectively larger portion than her fair share.  
   7
Migration decision 
It appears that as many as 77 per cent of the migrants took themselves the decision to migrate 
while the rest of them were persuaded or even forced by their parents to leave (Table 3). 
Among the children who stayed in the community, 72 per cent chose themselves to stay in 
the community while the others remained following their parents’ decision. 
 
We consider that parents are responsible for the migration decision of one of their migrant 
children in the three following situations: (i) the parents wanted a child to migrate against the 
child’s will; (ii) both parents and child agreed and the parents took the final migration 
decision; (iii) both wanted the child to migrate and the child took the migration decision to 
please their parents.  
Table 3: Migration decision for migrants 
  % 
 
Parents wanted child to migrate while child did not want to 
 
Parents and child wanted the latter to migrate and parents took the final migration decision 
 
Parents and child wanted the latter to migrate and child took the migration decision to please 
parents 
 
Parents and child wanted the latter to migrate and child took the migration decision but not to 
please parents 
 














Source: see text. 
 
It is important to note that we use data collected at the level of the migrants to ascertain who 
took the migration decision. During the interviews, parents were reluctant to admit that they 
pushed their children to migrate whereas the children felt more at ease to discuss the subject. 
Another important issue concerns the recall nature of the data. Migrants could be tempted to 
somehow modify ex-post their role in the migration decision, for example by adapting their 
statement in function of the success of their migration experience. Several elements although 
indicate that this is not a problem in our case. First, the part of the questionnaire focusing on 
the migration decision has been constructed so as to avoid this type of problem: we did not 
directly ask who took the migration decision but constructed the variable from very detailed 
questions. Moreover, during the interviews, we paid special attention to this part of the 
questionnaire and we gained the impression that migrants were not unwilling to discuss the 
topic. Second, the information obtained from siblings, whenever possible, confirmed the 
statements of migrants in a large majority of cases. Finally, we observe that parents have a 
higher propensity to send away their first born children and that those children left the 
community at a younger age than the children who themselves took the decision to migrate.    8
Network 
Migration networks play an important role in the migration decision of most of the migrants 
who migrated on their own will. The migration network provides the migrant not only with a 
place to stay upon his arrival (73 per cent of the migrants went to live with an acquaintance) 
but also with a mean of access to the urban job market (jobs in La Paz and El Alto are almost 
exclusively obtained through acquaintances). 
 
















Migrant for whom parents took the migration decision 
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Source: see text. 
 
Most migrants (85 per cent) knew someone in their first destination and the average network 
size upon arrival in La Paz was 4 (Table 4). Yet, the size of the initial network is significantly 
higher for migrants who took themselves the migration decision compared to migrants for 
whom the parents took the migration decision.  
Work 
Upon arrival almost all migrants started to work immediately. At the time of our interview, 
54 per cent of the migrants were self-employed, of which 37 per cent owned their own 
business. The three main occupations for men are driver, builder, and tailor, while women 
mainly work as shopkeepers, stallholders or domestic servants. On average, a migrant earns 
1350 bolivianos per month2. There are however important income inequalities: the richest 10 
per cent earn more than 2560 bolivianos per month, while the poorest 10 per cent of the 
sample earn less than 400 bolivianos.  
 
A huge majority of parents were unable to tell us the type of occupation of their migrant 
children in the city. Because of this, we will use the fact that a migrant owns the home she is 
living in as a measure of her wealth in the inheritance function. Indeed, one can assume that 
parents are better informed about the home ownership status of their migrant child than about 
the profession or the income earned in the place of destination. In our migrant sample 53 per 
cent of the migrants owned the place they were living in. 
                                                 
2 At the time of the survey the exchange rate was: 1US dollar = 7 Bolivianos   9
3.3 Education 
The average number of years of education is very low for the children of the community 
sample. Unsurprisingly men have higher levels of education than women, 9 years against 6 
years on average (Table 5). In our communities parents generally pay for the education of 
their children and a lack of financial resources at the level of the parents obliges many 
children to drop out of education even before completing primary school. In a context of 
important liquidity constraints, parents plausibly choose to educate those children who show 
the highest abilities at school. We consider that parents interpret the fact that a child belongs 
to the five best students of their class as evidence that they possesses the capacities to study 
and we measure the childrens’ abilities based on this information. A significant positive 
correlation between a child’s abilities and the number of years of schooling completed then 
emerges from our data. 
Table 5: Level of education 
 Full  sample  Migrant  Non-migrant  Women  Men 
 






















































Source: see text. 
 
We also observe a higher proportion of high-ability children among migrants; the latter are 
also better educated than their non-migrant siblings (Table 5). This could indicate a link 
between the parents’ decision to selectively educate some of their children and their decision 
to send some of them away. This seems not to be the case in our sample. There is evidence 
that parents selectively educate their more able children with the objective of sending them 
away in the future (we observe a significant positive correlation between a child’s abilities 
and the parents’ desire for the child to migrate). Yet, there is no evidence that parents play a 
more important role in the migration decision of more able offspring; there is no significant 
correlation between a child’s abilities and the identity of the person responsible for the 
migration decision. 
3.4. Care 
Relations between parents and their migrant offspring are based on frequent visits. On 
average, migrants whom we interviewed visited their parents 11 times a year and 79 per cent 
of them returned at least once a year to help their family during the harvest period. 
Remittances are almost non-existent in the families of our sample, similar to the observation 
of Goetghebuer and Platteau (2010) for the Peruvian Andean communities. While migrants 
make gifts in cash or in kind at the time of their visits, the amounts or value of those gifts are 
negligible. During the interviews, parents told us that they did not expect the migrants to send   10
them money or gifts because the costs of sustaining a family are much higher in the city and 
because living conditions are also very difficult outside of the community. Parents only 
require from their migrant children that they keep contact and visit regularly. 
4 Empirical  strategy 
4.1. Specification of the inheritance function 
The central question of this paper is whether potential heirs play an active part in the 
inheritance decision. To address this question we use individual-level data collected from 
both the migrants and their family members who stayed in the native community.  
 
As a first step, we estimate an inheritance function for migrant children. It has the following 
form: 
xij= αij + βdij + γcij + δYij + ηZj+εij            (1) 
 
where xij stands for the treatment, of migrant child i belonging to family j, during the 
inheritance process; dij is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if a child declared to his 
parents, at the moment of inheritance or prior to the event, that she was not interested in the 
family land or if she rejected her share of inheritance at the moment of inheritance; cij is a 
dummy variable which takes value 0 if the parents took the migration decision and value 1 if 
the child took it; Yij is a vector of individual characteristics which can influence land 
inheritance while Zj is a vector of family characteristics. 
 
Our main variable of interest concerns the self-declared disinterest of the migrant child in 
land in the native community. Indeed, we want to test the hypothesis that heirs play an active 
role in the inheritance process. If this hypothesis is correct we should observe a positive 
relationship between dij and unfavourable access to family land.  
 
A second explanatory variable we are interested in is the identity of the person responsible 
for the migration decision. In a context of important migration, one might wonder whether 
the circumstances surrounding the migration decision have an impact on the parents’ bequest 
decision. In the presence of land scarcity, parents may be tempted to push some children to 
migrate in order to relax the land constraint. In addition, some children may themselves 
decide to leave the community with a view of escaping poverty and trying their luck outside 
of their native community. In both cases, we expect inheritance patterns to be unequal 
between siblings in the sense that either at the prompting of the parents or following their 
own decision some children will forsake their inheritance share or accept a lower share than 
their siblings who have remained in the community. In this case it should be immaterial 
whether the parents or the children made the migration decision. Things may not be so 
simple, however. On the one hand, parents might choose to send away some offspring whom 
they will support during the beginning of the migration process and compensate the others by 
granting them a higher share of inheritance. If this is true, then children for whom parents 
took the migration decision will have a higher probability of receiving a smaller share of 
inheritance and we will observe a positive relation between cij and exclusion from land 
inheritance or unfavourable access to it. On the other hand, parents might want to punish 
children who migrated against their will by granting them a lower share of inheritance.   11
Finally, parents might feel a higher sense of responsibility towards offspring whom they sent 
away to face an uncertain future and they might want to provide them with the option of 
returning to the community in case they lose their work.  
 
Two types of econometric models are used to estimate the inheritance function depending on 
the dependent variable. We rely on a probit specification3to determine the factors explaining 
exclusion from land inheritance, a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the child receives no 
land and 0 otherwise. To analyse the factors explaining unprivileged, fair, or privileged 
treatment during the land inheritance process we use a generalized ordered probit model with 
xij ordered from unprivileged to privileged through fair treatment. The generalized ordered 
probit is the most appropriate model in this case as it takes into account the ordered structure 
of our dependent variable and relaxes the parallel lines assumption which does not hold in 
our case. In both specifications we control for community effects and cluster effects at family 
level.  
4.2 Endogeneity 
Because of the structure of our data our estimation strategy is potentially vulnerable to 
different endogeneity biases.  
Childrens’ disinterest in family land 
A first bias might occur if strong equal sharing norms dictate inheritance decisions in the 
society, as it is the case in the Bolivian Altiplano. In this context, parents might be ashamed 
to admit that they excluded one of their children from inheritance and consequently declare 
that the child herself refused the land. This seems, however, rather implausible in our survey 
area—during the interviews, parents expressed indeed genuine disarray concerning the lack 
of interest of their migrant offspring in land. Some of the parents even told us that they did 
not know to whom they will be able to bequest their land because all their offspring had 
migrated and none of them is interested in the land. This does however not completely rule 
out the possibility that some parents tried to justify their bequest decision by declaring that 
the children were not interested in land. To test for that possibility we therefore run another 
regression where we use data collected at the migrants’ level concerning the children’s self-
declared lack of interest in land inheritance as explanatory variable. 
 
A second problem concerns reverse causality. Children who have not inherited land or do not 
expect to receive land from their parents might prefer to declare that they do not want to 
inherit land. This would happen if the excluded children prefer to be perceived as the master 
of their own fate, rather than as the unfortunate victims of a parental decision. Fortunately, 
we are able to exclude this possibility of reverse causality by using the twofold structure of 
our data. Since we have collected information about the migrant children’s disinterest in land 
inheritance from both the migrants themselves and their family members remaining in the 
communities of origin, we can use the discrepancies in the answers of the two types of 
respondents to reject reverse causality.  
 
If it is true that children declare that they do not want to inherit land because they anticipate 
that they will not receive it the following observation should be true: the proportion of 
                                                 
3 We also used a complementary log log specification because of the high proportion of zeros (80 per cent) 
which only reinforced our results.   12
children barred from land inheritance among those who declared that they told their parents 
that they were not interested in land is identical whether the statement has been or not 
confirmed by other family members. It is revealing that the proportion of excluded children 
turns out to be significantly different between the two categories (Table 6). Indeed, all the 
children for whom the declaration of disinterest was confirmed were excluded while this is 
only true for 16.4 per cent of those for whom disinterest was not confirmed by family 
members. Moreover, the proportion of children excluded from land inheritance among the 
latter category is not significantly different when compared to migrant children for whom 
both migrant and family members declared that the migrant did not tell their parents that they 
were not interested in family land. 
Table 6: Proportion of excluded children  
 Proportion  of 
excluded children 
Std. Err.  99% Conf. interval 
 
Migrants stated that they did not tell parents 
that they did not want to inherit family land 
 
(i)  Confirmed by family members 
 
(ii)  Not confirmed by family members 
 
 
Migrants stated that they told parents that they 
did not want to inherit family land 
 
(i)  Confirmed by family members 
 































































Source: see text. 
 
 Migration decision 
An initial problem one could worry about concerns reverse causality between the manner a 
child is treated during the inheritance process and his migration decision. One can reasonably 
assume that a child who was denied land access has a higher probability to take the decision 
to migrate. However, inheritance takes almost always place after the migration decision was 
made by the offspring in our communities, namely when parents are too old to cultivate their 
land or when the parents die.  But this is not sufficient to rule out reverse causality. Indeed, 
one can still argue that offspring are able to anticipate the results of the inheritance decision 
based on their personal characteristics and take the decision to migrate anticipating that they 
will not receive land from their parents in the future. Yet, this is not very plausible for 
Andean communities where the equal distribution norm between children living in the 
community is very strong. Childrem living in the community are only excluded for very 
serious motives and, as we have seen in section 3, the probability of exclusion is close to zero 
for children remaining in the community. 
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A second bias could occur if parents justify their bequest decision on the basis of the 
offspring’s migration decision. However, we avoid this type of bias because we use data on 
the migration decision collected at the level of the migrant. 
 
Finally, given our interest in elucidating a possible causal relationship between the identity of 
the person responsible for the migration decision and the outcome of the inheritance decision, 
we have to address the problem of omitted variables. As robustness check for our result 
concerning the migration decision we will use an instrumental variable approach in which the 
instrument is the size of the network available to the migrant in La Paz and El Alto before 
migration. There exists a general consensus in the literature that migration networks play an 
important in the migration decision (see the studies on rural-urban migration in India 
(Banerjee 1984, 1991), Germany (Bauer and Zimmerman 1997) and the Philippines (Caces 
1986; Findley 1987). We have seen in Section 3 that children who themselves take the 
decision to migrate know a larger number of persons in La Paz and El Alto prior to migration, 
and we use this result to instrumentalize the identity of the person responsible for the 
migration decision in our inheritance function. 
4.3  The demand for inheritance function 
After establishing the role of migrants in the inheritance process we will turn our attention to 
the determinants of the migrant’s disinterest in land in their native community. We anticipate 
that the cargo system will play a determining role in the migrant’s decision to refuse land in 
the Bolivian Altiplano. It is thus worth providing some more details about the cargo system 
so as to better understand the costs that it involves and the possible variations that are 
empirically exploitable.  
The cargo system  
Indeed, in the Bolivian Altiplano, structural elements of traditional Andean organizations are 
still prevalent today, and the pre-conquest communal decision making power concerning the 
disposition of land remains largely intact (Albó 1988; Barragn et al. 2007). Neither the 
Spanish invaders nor the ruling hispanicized national elite of the post-revolutionary period 
were able to destroy the strong communal structures of the Andean peasant communities of 
Bolivia. Andean peasants accepted, without really challenging their legitimacy, the heavy tax 
and labour burdens imposed by the ruling classes, but on the other hand they never accepted 
to abandon their cultural heritage and their ethnic identities (Albó 1988; Rasnake 1988; Klein 
1992).  
 
Within the communities of the Bolivian Altiplano, the assembly and the cargo system are 
perceived as fundamental institutions. They constitute the main vectors of community 
cohesion and are the real pillars of the community. The assembly, composed of the heads of 
the landholding families, is the highest level of authority in the community. It is in this 
assembly that the most important decisions concerning work organization, administrative 
questions, and relations with the outside world are taken. Participation in the assembly is very 
important and even mandatory in some communities. If possible, resolutions are adopted by 
consensus so that all the members of the community regard them as binding.  
 
The cargo communales have to be assumed by the heads of landholding families in return to 
access to land. Authority positions are attributed following a rotation principle, and every 
head of landholding households has to assume different offices during his lifetime, ideally   14
ascending the entire hierarchical ladder. The rotation principle for high positions within the 
ayllu, the kurakas, was established by the Spanish authorities after the rebellion of the 1780s 
led by kurakas from different parts of the Andeans. Before this era, kurakaship followed the 
rule of hereditary succession, while lower authority positions, the ones concerning the 
organization of smaller ayllu units, were probably already attributed following a rotation rule 
(Rasnake 1988). The fulfillment of the cargos implies important financial, labour and time 
costs since authorities have to organize and bear the costs of different ritual festivities and 
some authority position require weekly presence in the community. Yet, holding an authority 
position is seen as a service to the community and does not award any power to its holder. 
Moreover, the prestige gains proceeding from a cargo position are comparatively low leading 
some members of the community to try to eschew such duties. However, most positions 
include important religious and ritual functions and the community holds therefore the right 
to take away land from any member who does not serve his cargo (Albó 1988; Rasnake 
1988). This said, there exist significant differences in the stringency and enforceability of the 
rules related to landownership between ayllus (communities existing since pre-colonial times) 
and ex-haciendas (communities originating from the dissolution of the highland haciendas 
during the 1953 agrarian revolution). While ayllus have maintained most of the ancient 
organizational patterns, ex-hacienda communities have adapted some modern and less 
restrictive organizational structures. Moreover, in the course of the land revolution, land titles 
were distributed to members of ex-haciendas and while only a very small number of today’s 
community members is still in the possession of a valid land title this renders the threat of 
land confiscation less credible in these communities.  
Empirical specification of the demand for inheritance function 
In the light of the above we include the characteristics of the community regarding the 
importance of the cargo system into our demand for inheritance function for migrants: 
 
Refusalij= αij + βwageij + γayllu + µ ayllu*wage + δ Yij + η Zj+εij        (2) 
 
Refusal is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 in the following cases : (i) the migrants 
declared that they were not interested in inheriting land, (ii) the migrants refused the land 
inheritance at the time of bequest, (iii) the migrants donated it.   
 
Migrants draw three main economic benefits from holding land in their native community: 
First, there are the incomes obtained from the cultivation of the land even though these are 
small in the Altiplano of Bolivia where the soil is very poor. Second, we have the insurance 
benefits associated to community participation (Stark and Levhari 1982). Finally, some 
migrants may participate in the life of the community because of the political benefits 
expected from participation. Since the emergence of the ‘indianist’ movements the 
membership in a community has indeed become a master card in the political game. These 
benefits, especially of the first two types, are probably more important for less wealthy 
migrants so that we expect a positive relation between migrant’s income and the probability 
that he refuses land inheritance.  
 
However, one must also take into account the important costs associated to landownership in 
the Bolivian Altiplano, and these costs will almost certainly be more constraining for poor 
migrants. In particular, we anticipate that the migrant’s propensity to refuse land bequest is 
higher if the native community belongs to the ayllu category instead of being an ex-hacienda. 
This relationship is expected to be particularly strong for less wealthy migrants who are less   15
able to bear the costs arising from the cargo system such as it prevails in ayllu communities. 
We expect thus a positive coefficient for γ and a negative coefficient for µ. The sign of β will 
depend on whether the costs or the benefits associated to land ownership will play a more 
dominant role in the migrant’s inheritance decision in ex-haciendas. 
 
We use a probit specification to estimate the heir’s inheritance decision function where we 
control for cluster effects at family level and community effects. The use of an interaction 
term in non-linear models is slightly more complex than in linear models and we will use the 
methodology proposed by Norton et al. (2004) to test for the sign and the significance of the 
interaction term.  
 
Before discussing our results it is important to stress that, because of the nature of our data 
and the complexity of the question under investigation, we cannot claim to establish causal 
relations between our dependent and explanatory variables. We believe, however, that we are 
able to show interesting correlations which enable us to better understand the factors 
underlying a child’s decision to refuse his share of land inheritance in his native community. 
5 Results 
To analyse the impact of a child’s lack of interest in land on land access we estimate the 
inheritance function (1) for the migrant children for whom we were able to collect first-hand 
information concerning the migration decision and other important personal characteristics.  
5.1 Inheritance  function 
The key result of our first regression (Table 7 regression (i)) is that children’s declared lack 
of interest in land in their native community has a positive significant impact on exclusion 
from land inheritance. Children seem thus to play an active role in the inheritance process.  
 
However, because our first regression is based on data collected from family members living 
in the community, we have to ascertain that this result is not driven by parents who justify 
their decision to exclude some offspring from land inheritance under the pretext that the 
offspring were not interested in the family estate. Towards this end, we estimate a second 
regression (Table 7 regression (ii)) on the basis of the migrant’s declared lack of interest as 
assessed by themselves rather than by family members. We again observe a significant 
positive coefficient associated to the migrant’s disinterest variable which confirms the results 
of our first regression. The smaller size of the coefficient in the second regression can be 
explained by the fact that more migrants than family members, living in the community of 
origin, reported having told their parents that they were not interested in family land. Indeed, 
some family members might not have been informed about the migrant’s preference, some 
might have forgotten their child’s statement or have preferred not to take it seriously. Lack of 
interest of their migrant children in the family estate hurts many parents who prefer to ignore 
their children’s disinterest and hope that they will change their mind in the future.    16
Table 7: Impact of heir’s inheritance decision 
  Probit - exclusion from land inheritance 




Migrant declared disinterest (community data) 
 
Migrant declared disinterest (migrant data) 
 
Migrant stated she declared disinterest 
(not confirmed by family members) 
 
Migrant stated she did not declare disinterest 
(not confirmed by family members) 
 
Migrant stated she declared disinterest  
(confirmed by family members) 
 




Frequency of visits 
 
Nr. of migrant siblings 
 




Years of education 
 
Best student*years of education 
 










































































































































































Note: *significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors 
clustered at family level between brackets. 
Source: see text. 
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Finally, we can exploit the fact that fewer family members than migrants referred to the 
latter’s disinterest in family land as a further mean to reject reverse causality. As pointed out 
earlier, if children declared to their parents that they were not interested in family land 
because they had been excluded or anticipated to be excluded from inheritance, than we 
should observe a significant positive coefficient associated to the disinterest variable 
irrespective of whether family members confirmed that the migrants had told their parents of 
their lack of interest. This does however not come out in our data (Table 7 regression (iii)). It 
is revealing that among the migrants who declared that they informed their parents about their 
disinterest, only those migrants whose claim has been confirmed by family members have a 
significantly higher probability of exclusion. 
 
We can therefore conclude that children take an active part in the inheritance decision by 
voluntarily forgoing their share of family land in their community of origin. Moreover, a lack 
of interest in family land is among the most important driving forces behind the exclusion of 
migrant children from land inheritance.  
 
This result thus strongly supports the demand for inheritance hypothesis of Goetghebuer and 
Platteau (2010). This said, the children’s disinterest in land is not the only explanation for the 
exclusion of some migrant children from land bequest. Parents also play an important role in 
the inheritance decision and the second objective of this paper is to understand which factors 
underlie the parents’ decision to deprive some of their migrant children from land tenure. 
Among the factors influencing the parents’ bequest decision, the migration decision and more 
precisely the identity of the person responsible for the migration decision stands out as one of 
the key determinants. Indeed, children who took themselves the decision to migrate have a 
significantly higher probability to be excluded from land inheritance compared to children for 
whom the parents took the migration decision (Table 7 regression (i)).4 This result can be 
explained either by the parents desire to punish those children who took the decision to 
migrate against their will, or by a stronger feeling of responsibility of the parents towards the 
children whom they sent away. To separate these two explanations we distinguish among the 
children who decided themselves to migrate those who moved with the agreement of their 
parents from those who migrated against the latter’s will (Table 8 regression (iv)). We see 
that both types of decision making children have a higher probability of exclusion compared 
to children whose migration was decided by the parents. Moreover, the difference in the 
coefficients between the two types is non-significant. Based on this evidence, the second 
story appears more plausible: parents are more concerned about a child for whom they took 
the migration decision. 
 
One might wonder if children who themselves took the decision to migrate continue to face a 
higher probability of exclusion once the land constraint has been relaxed. Indeed, the results 
of regression (iv) (Table 8) indicate that land scarcity might be one of the driving forces 
behind the exclusion of some children. In addition, the previous regression seems to indicate  
 
 
                                                 
4 As a robustness check (Appendix A) we also run the same regression using as explanatory variable a 
migration decision variable constructed by ordering the five levels of implication of the child in the migration 
decision. Again, we find a significant positive correlation between the level of implication of the child in the 
migration decision and their exclusion from land inheritance. Furthermore, we changed our definition of the 
offspring’s responsibility in the migration decision. We constructed a new dummy variable considering that 
children who took the migration decision are responsible for their migration decision independently of whether 
they did it to please their parents or not. This even reinforces our results concerning the migration decision    18
Table 8: Determinants of the parental bequest decision 














Migrant declared disinterest  
 
Migration decision (child) 
 
Migration decision (child) 
Parents wanted migration 
 
Migration decision (child) 




Migration decision*land size 
 
Frequency of visits 
 
Nr. of migrant siblings 
 




Years of education 
 
Best student*years of educ. 
 

































































































































































































Note: *significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors 
clustered at family level are between brackets. 
Source: see text. 
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that the exclusion of children who took themselves the decision to migrate is not a 
punishment for past behaviour but may be rather a default option. To test the impact of land 
size on the probability of exclusion for children who were themselves responsible for the 
migration decision, we add an interaction term between the migration decision variable and 
land size. In agreement with our first intuition, we find that land scarcity is the main driving 
force behind the exclusion from inheritance of children who took themselves the migration 
decision: these children have a significantly higher probability to be excluded from land 
inheritance if land size is small, and this probability decreases with land size. 
 
In a last step, we want to assess the impact of the identity of the person responsible for the 
migration decision on treatment during the inheritance process. We again observe that a child 
who made the decision to migrate has a higher probability to receive an unfavourable 
treatment. Yet, the identity of the migration decision maker does not influence the probability 
to get a favourable treatment (Table 8 Generalized Ordered Probit). This result is in line with 
the previous results: if it is true that parents avoid excluding children whom they themselves 
pushed to migrate (because they feel more responsible towards them) and if they only 
exclude other migrant children because of land scarcity (and not because they want to punish 
them), there is no reason why the first type of offspring should receive a preferential 
treatment compared to the latter.  
Secondary results  
Turning to our control variables, the first result worth highlighting concerns the caring 
behaviour of children towards their parents. Our measure of care, namely the number of visits 
of parents by offspring, is significantly positively correlated with land access (Table 7 
regression (i)). This result holds when we control for children who gave up their land rights, 
and is consistent with the strategic bequest theory of Bernheim et al. (1985). Yet, the positive 
relationship between caring and land access could also be explained by a stronger mutual 
bond between the parents and some of their offspring. Nevertheless, the strategic bequest 
theory seems to be the most credible explanation in our case since in the discussions parents 
often mentioned a lack of caring from their children as one of the main reasons for the 
exclusion from inheritance. While the strategic bequest theory thus seems to explain the 
unfavourable treatment of some migrant children during the inheritance process it does not 
explain the favourable treatment of other migrant children as the frequency of visits is 
negatively correlated with the probability of receiving a higher share of family land (Table 8 
Generalized Ordered Probit). One possible explanation for this rather surprising result could 
be that parents have a preference for some children to whom they will grant a higher share of 
land independently of their caring behaviour. Children might anticipate this and care less for 
their parents.  
 
With respect to family size, we have to distinguish between the number of migrant and non-
migrant siblings because these two categories of siblings might have opposite effects on the 
probability of inheriting land for a migrant. We then observe that a higher number of non-
migrant siblings increases the probability of exclusion for a migrant (Table 7 regression (i)). 
This first result is not surprising in a context of land scarcity where a higher number of 
children remaining in the community will tighten the land constraint thereby prompting the 
exclusion of some children. A larger number of migrant siblings, on the other hand, has no 
effect on the probability of exclusion (Table 7 regression (i)). This latter result could be 
explained by the fact that the positive effect of a higher number of migrant siblings on land   20
pressure is offset by the negative effect of an increase in competition between migrant 
siblings.  
 
Our results regarding education are in line with both the story of selective education and the 
reward for education story. Indeed, we observe that children with low abilities and low levels 
of education have a significantly lower probability of exclusion from land inheritance (Table 
7 regression (i)). This is consistent with the selective education hypothesis which predicts that 
children who have received a lower share of education than their siblings will be 
compensated by a higher share of land if parents invested smaller resource in them because of 
credit constraints.5On the other hand, we observe a reward for education with respect to high 
ability children (Table 7 regression (i)). This could be explained by the fact that parents 
attach more importance to the educational achievements of high ability offspring.  
 
Concerning children’s wealth, we find a negative correlation between home ownership and 
land access: being the owner of one’s home increases the probability of exclusion by six per 
cent, on average (Table 7 regression (i)). This result could be explained by altruistic concerns 
of the parents which induce them to favour offspring who are less well-off and have 
consequently a higher need of financial transfers and the insurance provided by the fall-back 
option of land. But, it is also possible that the result arises from exchanges between parents 
and children. The exchange model predicts indeed that some parents might prefer to stop 
interacting with wealthy children and consequently exclude them from inheritance if the 
share of inheritance they have to allow to those children becomes too large (because of the 
richer offspring’s comparatively stronger bargaining position). Yet, if exchange motivations 
are the main driving forces in the bequest decision, we should observe that a wealthy child, 
who inherits land, has a higher probability of getting a favourable treatment. This is not the 
case in our study (Table 8 Generalized Ordered Probit) so that altruism seems to be the most 
convincing explanation. 
 
Two last significant coefficients are associated to gender and parenthood. First, we observe 
that women have a higher probability of being denied land access through inheritance (Table 
7 regression (i)). This last result can seem surprising as parents have the legal obligation to 
share land equally between male and female children. Traditionally, however men inherited 
larger shares of family land than women and it can take much time before new laws replace 
ancient customs. Second, as expected and as has been found by Goetghebuer and Platteau 
(2010), migrant children with a bigger family have a lower probability of being excluded 
from land bequest and have a higher probability of receiving a larger share of land (Table 8). 
Further robustness checks 
To address the possible endogeneity bias in our estimation of the impact of the identity of the 
migration decision-maker on the inheritance distribution we propose an IV approach based on 
migrant’s network size prior to his migration. There is significant evidence that migrant 
networks reduce the initial migration risk by making information about the job market and 
housing conditions in the migration destination available to those who stay in the community 
(Taylor 1986; Gottlieb 1987; Boyd 1989). Moreover, migration networks reduce migration 
costs. They provide temporary lodging (Grossman 1989) and lower the adaptation costs 
                                                 
5As we have seen in section 4, there exists indeed evidence that, in our communities, parents cannot afford as 
much education for their children as they would like to and that parents make the education decision based on 
the offspring’s ability. We expected thus that children with low abilities and low levels of education would have 
been compensated with respect to children with higher abilities.   21
(Massey et al. 1987). Finally, networks have a positive impact on employment and wages 
(Massey et al. 1987; Munshi 2003). 
 
The crucial role of migrant networks in the provision of accommodation and job search is 
also confirmed for the migrants in our sample as we have seen in section 3. The importance 
of migrant networks appears nonetheless to differ significantly between those migrants who 
themselves took the decision to migrate and those who were sent away by their parents. 
While the migration network played an important role for the former it does not seem to be 
the case for the latter. Indeed, many migrants sent away by their parents work as domestic 
servants and were actually recruited by specialized urban agents who visited the rural 
communities. Moreover, the parents and not the children’s network should have driven the 
migration decision when parents took the initiative and while the two networks might be 
related they should not perfectly match. We will therefore use the number of individuals 
whom a migrant child knew in La Paz and El Alto prior to his migration as instrument for the 
identity of the person responsible for the migration decision (Table 9). 
Table 9: Migration decision 












Note: *significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1% level. Standard errors are between 
brackets. 
Source: see text. 
 
As a further robustness check, we removed the siblings who were already living in La Paz 
and El Alto in our measure of the network. 
Table 10: Determinants of the parental bequest decision, IV approach 
  Probit (ii)  Reduced Form  IV Probit, siblings 
included 
IV Probit, without 
siblings 
 


































Note: *significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors 
clustered at family level are between brackets. 
Source: see text. 
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The results of the IV approach are in line with the results of our main specification (Table 
10). The coefficient associated to the migration decision variable remains positive and 
significant and its magnitude is even higher than in the probit estimation. This suggests that a 
hypothetical bias is downwards rather than upwards. However, given the restrictions in the 
first step of the IV probit we do not want to put too much emphasis on the magnitude of the 
IV estimate. It is nevertheless reassuring that the reduced form and the IV estimates are 
consistent with the arguments presented above. 
5.2  Demand for inheritance function 
The key result emerging from our first set of regressions is that migrant children take an 
active part in the inheritance process through their decision to accept or to give up land 
inheritance in their community of origin. In the light of this result, it is essential to understand 
which factors underlie the child’s decision. Towards this purpose, we first estimate a decision 
function including the standard explanatory variables: income, employment stability, 
migration duration and other personal and family characteristics (Table 11 regression (1)). In 
this first regression, the variable measuring employment stability is the only one who is 
significantly correlated with the decision to forsake land inheritance. The sign of the 
coefficient associated to this variable seems however counter intuitive: we observe a negative 
relation between employment stability and the renouncement of land inheritance, which is in 
contradiction with the prediction of the insurance hypothesis. This is however ignoring the 
role of transaction costs stemming from land ownership in rural communities. When we take 
these latter into account, our result appears less surprising: more stable employment 
conditions allow the migrant to devote more time and resources to community duties and 
consequently enable her to keep land in her native community. To verify whether this 
interpretation is correct, we estimate equation (2) including as a new dependent variable 
ayllu, which takes into account  the characteristics of the community regarding the 
importance of the cargo duties. 
 
The central result of this second regression is that a significantly higher proportion of 
migrants forgo their land inheritance in ayllus, where the duties associated to landownership 
are more burdensome and enforceable than in ex-haciendas (Table 11 regression (2)). 
Moreover, we now observe a significant negative correlation between income and the 
forsaking of land inheritance in ayllus while the correlation is positive for ex-haciendas. A 
rise in income has indeed two opposite effects: on one hand, it reduces the value of the fall-
back option associated to land tenure but on the other hand it also increases the migrant’s 
ability to face the costs associated to landownership. As expected, the latter effect dominates 
in ayllus while the reverse is true in ex-haciendas. 
 
In the light of this result, one may wonder whether the motives guiding the migrant’s decision 
are different in ayllu and ex-hacienda communities. To test for this possibility, we estimate 
two separate demand for inheritance functions(Table 11 regression (3)&(4)). We then 
observe that the standard explanations hold in the case of ex-haciendas. Migrants with higher 
income and higher levels of education are more inclined to forsake their share of inheritance 
in these communities (Table 11 regression (4)). In ayllus, high transaction costs seem 
however to be the predominant motivation behind the migrant’s decision. In these 
communities, migrants with low income and low employment security have a higher 
probability of forsaking their share of land inheritance(Table 11 regression (3)). These 
migrants are probably unable to support the high costs associated to land tenure and are   23
consequently obliged to give up their inheritance share. If our interpretation is correct, it has 
important welfare implications since it means that those migrants who are in the greatest need 
of the fall-back option of land inheritance are also those who are obliged to forego it.  
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Note: *significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors 
clustered at family level are between brackets. 
Source: see text. 
 
Finally, a higher number of non-migrant siblings is positively associated with the decision to 
forgo one’s share of inheritance in ex-haciendas, but not in ayllus. One possible explanation 
is that the fulfilment of community norms has given more legitimacy to the migrants’ claim 
on land in ayllus. Migrants might consequently feel more entitled to demand their share of   24
inheritance vis-à-vis of their siblings who remained in the community. Regarding gender, we 
observe that women are more inclined than men to voluntarily abandon their share of 
inheritance in ayllus, while we see no gender difference in ex-haciendas. Perhaps women feel 
less entitled to demand land when the respect of traditions is a cornerstone of social cohesion, 
such as it is the case in ayllu communities.  
6 Conclusion 
In the communities of the Bolivian Altiplano both migrant children and the community 
intervene in the parents’ inheritance decision. The central result of our study, which confirms 
the demand for inheritance hypothesis suggested by Goetghebuer and Platteau (2010), is that 
migrant children take an active role in the inheritance process through their decision to accept 
or refuse their share of inheritance. This result has important welfare implications since the 
fall back option provided by land tenure in the native community and the associated 
possibility to return to the community are very valuable for migrants who are often subject to 
the vagaries of the urban labour market. In this light, the fact that some children choose 
themselves to forsake their claims on land in the native community, rather than being denied 
land tenure by their parents under some form of exclusive inheritance practice, suggests that 
the demand for land inheritance expressed by those migrants who most need it tends to be 
satisfied. This conclusion is supported by evidence regarding the characteristics of the 
migrants who forsake their inheritance rights. Yet with an important qualification: when the 
transaction costs associated to land ownership in a rural community are significant, such as in 
ayllu communities where participation in local activities and responsibilities is mandatory, it 
is the more economically insecure migrants who forsake their rights to land inheritance. High 
transaction costs consequently prevent the equalizing effects of demand-driven inheritance 
from taking place 
 
Finally, land inheritance is not completely determined by the demand expressed by children 
and parents still play a significant role. In this regard, a salient finding emerging from our 
analysis is that parents are influenced by the locus of the migration decision. When they 
themselves prompted a child to leave the community and try her luck in distant urban areas, 
they seem to feel more responsible for his economic destiny and appear therefore to be more 
reluctant to deprive him of her inheritance share.  
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Appendix A 
To test the robustness of our results concerning the identity of the person responsible for the 
migration decision we use two other definitions for the migration decision variable. First we 
construct a decision variable by ordering the five levels of implication of the child in the 
migration decision. Second, we create a new dummy variable considering that all the children 
who took the migration decision are responsible for their migration decision independently of 
whether they did it to please their parents or not. The results of these regressions are in line 
with the results of Section 5. 
Table A1: Determinants of the parents’ bequest decision 
  Probit – exclusion from land inheritance 





Migrant declared disinterest  
 




Frequency of visits 
 
Nr. of migrant siblings 
 




Years of education 
 
Best student*years of educ. 
 































































































Note: *significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors 
clustered at family level are between brackets 
Source: see text. 
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